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3 Reproducing vulnerabilities in agri-food systems: tracing the links between governance, 
4 financialisation and vulnerability in Europe post 2007-8. 
5 
6 
7 
8 Abstract 
9 
10 Interconnected sets of vulnerabilities have emerged in the European food system since 2007-8, 
11 raising concerns about food security in a region with arguably some of the most advanced and 
12 prosperous economies and environmental governance frameworks. Historically this is suggesting the 
13 
14 current ͚ double jeopardy͛ problem in food system vulnerability– with systemic declines both in 
15 sustainability (the ability of the food system to ecologically renew itself) and food security (the 
16 ability of a population to access sufficient nutritional foods and feed itself). By focussing on both 
17 drivers and impacts of food system vulnerabilities in the EU and UK, this paper explores a grounded 18 
19 and relational approach to financialisation- recognised as a key expression of recent growing 
20 vulnerabilities. 21 
22 Through the prism of the current socio- economic pressures facing food producers, and the 
23 emergence of potentially ͚ stranded assets͛ in the agri-food system more generally, the analysis seeks 
24 to show how the combined relationships between neo-liberalised governance and the market 
25 volatilities encouraged by new rounds of financialisation are creating ͚ nested͛ vulnerabilities. As we 26 
27 conclude, a critical, grounded and systemic understanding of food system vulnerabilities thus 
28 becomes a key feature and precursor for potentially developing more resilient agri-food systems -- 
29 both regionally and globally. 
30 
31 
32 
33 Key words: food vulnerabilities, financialisation, stranded assets, neo-liberalism, food systems. 
34 
35 
36 
37 1.  Introduction: tracing the links between food governance, financialisation and nested 
38 vulnerabilities. 
39 
40 The paper first provides a conceptual and empirical overview of food system vulnerabilities with 
41 reference to the EU and UK. This provides a basis for then developing a more focussed and grounded 
42 
43 examination of the role of financialisation as a driver of a range of interconnected and nested 
44 vulnerabilities  during  this  recent  period.  We  focus  here  specifically  upon  the  links  between 
45 financialised exposure of the farm producer sector, and then the even more recent vulnerabilities 
46 which  are  emerging  within  this  more  financialised  system  as  increasing  limitations  to  the 
47 exploitation of carbon-based assets become recognised. 48 
49 
In recent years following 2007-8, the food system has witnessed the intensive application of complex 
50 
51 financial products whose ͚fictitious͛ value is linked to fixed and ordinary assets like farm land, 
52 bushels of corn or wheat, or the myriad of products placed upon corporate retailers shelves. This re- 
53 commodifying and ͚rebundling͛ process in the face of growing food shortages and price rises has 
54 been  centrally  facilitated  by  neo-liberalising  states  (as  in  the  UK),  which  contemporaneously 
55 withdrew public systems of support  (austerity)  whilst stimulating  private- risk financialisation. 56 
57 Following and developing a food system perspective, therefore, signals that these co-processes of 
58 neo-liberalising governance and corporate financialisation have combined and far- reaching effects 
not only upon the food production sector, but also on consumers and the complex varieties of firms 
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3 and actors operating between producers and consumers. In short, this points us in the direction- as 
4 much of the succeeding analysis demonstrates- in needing to trace the contextualised and nested 
5 linkages   between:   (i)   neo-liberalising   food   governance,   (ii)   the   socio-political   impacts   of 
6 financialisation and, (iii) the relatively recent deepening of nested vulnerabilities both for producers 
7 
8 and consumers. 
9 
10 What we postulate here is that there is the need to conceptually and empirically explore the revised 
11 and systemic interconnections between these three spheres. Isakson (2015: 571) in a special issue of 
12 the Journal of Agrarian Change devoted to financialisation, attempts to link the (re-)production of 
13 vulnerabilities (among farmers) with financialisation: 14 
15 ͚Vulnerability  is  contextual  and  dynamic.  It  is  produced  through  evolving  social  relations  and 
16 
17 articulated  within  a  specific  socio-ecological  setting  (Taylor,  2015).  The  commodification  of 
18 agriculture and agrarian relations, the deterioration of ecological conditions and growing inequality 
19 resulting from agricultural modernisation and the rollback of state protections under neo-liberal 
20 restructuring... combined, these processes have helped produce a global peasantry, that, in many 
21 ways is highly vulnerable to the contemporary risks emanating from climate change and increasingly 22 
23 volatile market conditions͛. He concludes (557): ͚Financial means cannot substitute for the socio and 
24 ecological foundations of security.͛ 
25 
26 The recent conjunctions between neo-liberalist food governance, new rounds of financialisation, and 
27 indeed its relationships with setting off a wider and deepening set of social vulnerabilities is creating, 
28 overall, as we shall analytically examine below, a food landscape which is far more volatile, not just 
29 in market terms. For as Visser et al in the same special issue (2015) suggest, key areas needed for 30 
31 further research on finanicalisation involve tracing thorough the very social vulnerabilities and 
32 volatilities which it inherently creates; and identifying the diversity of ͚actors in context͛ who 
33 promote the drivers, strategies and discourses of the processes as they unfold.  They argue (2015: 34 547): 
35 
36 ͚To  what  extent  are  these  drivers,  strategies  and  legitimating  discourses  simply  about  the 
37 management of risk, and to what extent are they about generating profit at the expense of others? 
38 
39 Such research is crucial in order to gain a deeper understanding of the rise of finance in agriculture, 
40 and the possibilities and limitations of regulation͛. 
41 
42 As we shall witness below, this very process of construction of nested vulnerabilities is not unique to 
43 producers; it also heavily affects the food security of consumers. In the succeeding analysis we will 
44 bring a variety  of  evidence together from EU and UK sources to  examine  the  rise  of  nested 
45 vulnerabilities in the contemporary food system and point to the critical and socio-political location 
46 
47 of financialisation in this process. This involves: (i) some of the key results from an extensive media 
48 analysis during the years since the crisis erupted (2007-8); (ii) a set of selected expert interviews 
49 conducted in the UK, and (iii) a Delphi survey of European experts concerning what they regarded as 
50 the main drivers of food system vulnerabilities. The first part of the analysis (section 4) focusses 51 
52 upon the identifying the interdependent key sets of drivers (including financialisation) of food 
53 vulnerabilities,  as  identified  by  key  stakeholders  and  experts  in  the  UK  and  EU  food  policy 
54 community. In the second part of the analysis (section 5) we examine the more grounded social and 
55 economic impacts of these vulnerabilities upon UK farm producers, state policy and the future 
56 possibilities for a redirection of financial investments as a result of their impacts upon carbon- 57 
58 emissions and climate change more broadly. 
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3 
4 
5 2. New volatilities and nested vulnerabilities in the food system 
6 
7 
8 The global food, fuel, financial and resulting fiscal crisis (FFFF) emerging from 2007-8 has led to the 
9 rejuvenation and reproduction of a series of interconnected food system vulnerabilities that cover 
10 both food unsustainabilities and food insecurities. As figure 1 below attempts to summarise in 
11 
12 historical perspective, the production and consumption arenas in the food system have become 
13 more systemically connected and more vulnerable over recent years. Since 2007-8, it can be argued 
14 that both the sustainability and security dimensions of food have diminished compared to earlier 
15 governance phases, when both the security and sustainability of the food system was at higher 16 
17 levels. Now both realms are seen to be in crisis. The combinative nature of this crisis has been 
18 documented for some time both in Europe (see, for example, Marsden, et al. 2010; 2013) and in 
19 North America, where the corporate private-interest model has recently been discussed as an 
20 expression of a wider crisis associated with a persistent neo-liberal form of food regulation (see Wolf 
21 and Bonanno, 2014; Busch 2014). As Bonanno (2014:27) argues: 22 
23 ͚The limits of neo-liberalism are theoretically clear and empirically evident. Arguably, the 
24 
25 crisis of the regime can be seen more as a demonstrated fact rather than a hypothesis. 
26 Additionally, existing contradictions make it problematic to argue about the existence of an 
27 organised system. Neo-liberalism appears more like a project in crisis, rather than a regime. 
28 Yet, and despite claims of economic unsustainability and lack of substantive democracy, 
29 neo-liberalism remains the dominant ideology and, in many instances, the preferred political 30 
31 choice of the second decade of the twenty first century.͛ 
32 
33 The food system is a central subset of these new contingencies, and it is one that, as we shall 
34 delineate in this paper, openly displays their contradictions and vulnerabilities, thereby reducing the 
35 overall legitimacy of the neo-liberal food regulatory system as a whole (see Ostry et al, 2016). 
36 
37 Figure 1: The changing balances between food security and sustainability in the UK food system 
38 Positioning food security and sustainability in the UK 
39 
40 Food Security High 
41 (Resilience) 
42 • High farming 
43 • National productivism 
44 • 94% self sufficiency • ͚Food from our own resources͛ 
45 • Food prices decline as a 
46 percentage of household income 
• Post-productivism 
• Food scares associated with intensification 
• Food surpluses 
• ͚Supermarketisation͛ 
• Growing imports 
• 60% self sufficiency 
47 
48 Sustainability High 
49 (Resilience) 
1954 - 1984 1984 - 2007  
Sustainability Low 
(Vulnerability) 
50 1930s - 1954 
51 • ͚Dig for Victory͛ 
52 • Rationing 
53 • Food and energy shortages 
54 
55 
56 
2007 - present 
 
• ͚Perfect storm͛ 
• Neo-productivism 
• Sustainable intensification 
• Alternate food networks 
• Rising household energy and food costs 
• Financial speculation 
Food Security Low 
57 (Vulnerability) 
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3 The paper attempts to identify and discuss the onset of interconnected food vulnerabilities through 
4 a focus on the food system in the EU and UK, where, since the start of the FFFF crisis, we have 
5 witnessed both the rejuvenation of the private- interest, corporate-led governance model, and an 
6 intensification of its social impacts and vulnerabilities; such that a renewed discourse around ͚food 
7 
8 security͛ has emerged (see Feeding Britain Report 2014; UK National Report, TRANSMANGO, 2015). 
9 This is leading to a new set of conjunctures which are far more unstable in comparison with the late 
10 20
th
century, which delivered what seemed to be abundant and socially legitimate food provision at a 
11 relatively cheap price for the majority of the population. Under the current conditions, by contrast, 12 
13 we can expect more volatile and nested vulnerabilities in food nutritional and provision systems 
14 operating at the same time and in parallel spaces. For instance, as we shall depict, we are witnessing 
15 the continued intensification of production and supply of food and the consequent removal of 
16 formerly viable farm businesses, at the same time as a growth in alternative food networks (AFNs) is 
17 occurring as a reaction to these trends. What is clear, and UK governance seems particularly prone 18 
19 to this, is that there is a lack of coherence and proactivity on the part of the State to act (and 
20 especially to positively intervene) in and on behalf of the wider public interest; over and above its 
21 private interest obligations to corporate (and increasingly financialised) private food interests. 
22 
23 These dynamics are tending to devalorise and disempower significant groups of consumers and 
24 producers, such that value is continually abstracted from both by the more concentrated and 
25 financialised corporate manufacturing, catering and retailer sectors. This is more evident today than 
26 
27 it was a decade ago, when the dominant private-interest food governance model could rely upon 
28 fairly stable and abundant procurement of food materials from around the world at a relatively 
29 cheap and   (albeit externalised) cost. At the same time, general levels of economic growth and 
30 universal state welfare spending also tended to uphold the effective demand and consumption of 
31 food goods for the majority of the low- income population. Prior to the ongoing FFFF crisis emerging 32 
33 from  2007-8,  whilst  there  was  a  general  recognition  that  the  food  system  was  increasingly 
34 ecologically unsustainable (see figure 1), its ability to secure food for the majority of the population 
35 was largely taken for granted. 
36 
37 As Moore (2016) and Marsden and Morley (2014) have recently pointed out, today the emerging 
38 conjuncture of resource depletion, on the one hand, and the continued withdrawal of national state 
39 welfare  nets  on  the  other,  together  with  the  upholding  of  a  continuing  neo-liberalising  and 
40 
41 financialised  corporate  food system, have  led to  the production  of  a new  set  of  nested  and 
42 recombinant food security vulnerabilities. 
43 
44 The current conditions have also further stimulated the corporate controlled ͚financialisation͛ of key 
45 aspects of the food system, as growing scarcities have led, in turn, to new rounds of speculative 
46 financial investments in land and key natural resources (see Ouma, (2016). New forms of market 
47 
48 instruments and investments are developed for financial and investment gain, thus often promoting 
49 short-term and ephemeral gains and volatilities in agri-food markets (see Burch and Lawrence, 2009; 
50 Clapp, 2014; Fairburn, 2014; Isakson, 2014b). One reaction to the crisis has thus been to continue to 
51 shift financial resources to resource based ͚safe-havens͛ and ͚land grabs͛, further reducing social and 
52 public- good investments that target vulnerabilities and inequalities. 53 
54 
These transformations, we argue here, will require innovative forms of food governance to replace 
55 
56 the current withdrawal of national-state food policy in the face of the dominant corporate and 
57 financialised food governance model. The related postulates underpinning this argument which we 
 
begin explore in this paper include the following: 
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3 (i) Since  2007-8  and  the  emergence  of  the  FFFF  crisis  there  has  been  a  political 
4 metamorphosis  between  national  state  polities  and  corporate  financialisation.  A 
5 common  effect  of  this  has  been  a  further  concentration  of  control  over  natural 
6 resources, infrastructure and food-based capital. 
7 
8 (ii) This process is deepening and reproducing food vulnerabilities and inequalities, while at 
9 the   same   time   promoting   separate   and   autonomous   ͞translocal   assemblages͟ 
10 (McFarlane, 2009) in the wider NGO and civic sectors. This is an outcome of ongoing 
11 efforts to ameliorate some of these vulnerabilities and to create new social and physical 12 
13 infrastructures that enhance (in the medium to long term) food system resilience. 
14 (iii) The dual and contested transformation process at play is creating new territorialised 
15 ͚niches͛ at the same time as the neo-liberal financialised model becomes a source of 
16 basic vulnerability itself (see our discussion below on ͚stranded assets͛, section 5) in that 
17 it tends to deepen both food unsustainability and food insecurity. 18 
19 (iv) Both financialisation and its nested vulnerabilities in food systems need empirically 
20 grounding  in  more  fine-grained  analyses  that  tease  out  the  economic  and  social 
21 relationships and dependences these concepts imply. For instance, in order to re-build 
22 more resilience and adaptive capacity in food systems it is necessary to fully address the 
23 embedded ways in which vulnerabilities and financialisation are working together. This 24 
25 provides a more integrated conceptual basis for understanding vulnerability (see Adger 
26 2006; Blaikie, 2004) as ͚the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses 
27 associated with environmental and social change and from the absence of the capacity 
28 to adapt͛ (Adger, 2006). 
29 (v) Critical in mediating the changing balances between the onset of nested vulnerabilities 30 
31 and the (potential) creation of adaptive capacities and resiliences is the question of the 
32 types and modes of food governance. These even in their most neo-liberal forms, play a 
33 critical role  in  conditioning  these  balances.  As  even the  conservative  International 
34 Monetary Fund has recently come to recognise: 35 
36 ͚In sum, the benefits of some policies that are an important part of the neo-liberal 
37 agenda  appear  to  have  been  somewhat  overplayed.  In  the  case  of  financial 
38 openness, some capital flows, such as foreign direct investment, do appear to confer 
39 the benefits to growth claimed for them. But for others, particularly short-term 
40 capital flows, the benefits to growth are difficult to reap, whereas the risks, in terms 41 
42 of greater volatility and increased risk of crisis, loom large͛ (Ostry et al 2016:40). 
43 (vi) It  follows  from  these  postulates,  as  we  will  address  in  the  conclusion,  that  the 
44 elimination or reduction of nested vulnerabilities in food systems, and their attendant 
45 capacities to build more resilience, will require systemic and governance attention, and 
46 indeed a shift and innovation in how the financialised ͚markets͛ are managed within (as 47 
48 well as beyond) their specific institutional contexts. 
49 
50 
51 
52 3.   Investigating vulnerabilities: Research Methods 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
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3 To better understand the nature and outcomes of the UK͛s food system vulnerabilities, a media 
4 analysis was conducted using a total of 475 text units from eight main British newspapers1 in the 
5 2010-2014 period. The text units were selected from the lexis-nexis database introducing ͚food 
6 security͛ or ͚food poverty͛ as key words, which resulted in a total of 2572 articles. The text units 
7 
8 were selected according to their relevance, source, topic and number of articles in that source. The 
9 qualitative software NVIVO was used to code and characterise a total of 21 vulnerability drivers and 
10 18 food system vulnerabilities that are associated with both immediate and more basic causes and 
11 with a diversity of food security framings. 12 
13 The media and expert stakeholder analysis was followed at EU level with a dephi-survey of food 
14 
15 policy stakeholders from the policy, NGO and food business sectors (see Marangus Faus et al, in 
16 press). We present below (box 1) some of the key quotations which focused upon aspects of 
17 financialisation as key drivers in the global food system. 18 
19 The main aim of this study was to identify global food system drivers and vulnerabilities that affect 
20 EU͛s food and nutrition security. To include as many different perspectives on the European food 
21 system as possible, we carried out a Delphi expert survey, where interviewees are considered as 
22 
23 informants on a specific subject, rather than being the object of research themselves. The research 
24 process entails different rounds of individual interviews, which are designed to avoid direct 
25 confrontation, maintain anonymity and avoid a pre-framing of issues as contentious as food and 
26 nutrition (Monney and Hunt, 2009). The overall aim of this method, which has proven especially 
27 useful to elicit opinions on complex issues such as climate change (Doria et al., 2009) or public food 28 
29 and health policy (Aschemann-Witzel et. al., 2012), is to facilitate consensus while also identifying 
30 divergent opinions that can provide the basis for policy changes or new research agendas (Rayens 
31 and Hahn, 2000). 32 
33 At the start of the research process, we identified – together with nine European research groups 
34 from different countries - 98 stakeholders with expertise on global and European food security from 
35 different backgrounds (civil society organisations, private sector and the public sector) and different 
36 
37 areas or stages of the food chain. Potential participants were contacted a minimum of two times 
38 each. In the end, a total of 45 international experts participated (39 in the first round and 27 in the 
39 second round), which formed what is normally considered a typical sample size for a policy Delphi 
40 method (Rayens and Hahn, 2000). This sample is also characterized by a high geographical diversity, 
41 since it included participants from 11 different countries and different sectors (18% private sector, 42 
43 43% public sector, 36% civil society organisations, 2% public-private partnership). The selection of 
44 experts was made in consultation with 9 academics from different European countries working on 
45 food security. 
46 
47 Section 5 of the analysis which focusses more specifically upon the impacts of financialisation and 
48 vulnerabilities is based upon additional key interviews and analysis of secondary data which followed 
49 
50 the earlier surveys mentioned here. 
51 
52 
53 
54 4.   Exploring the anatomy of vulnerability in the post 2007-8 UK and EU food system 55 
56 The UK is a particularly illustrative national example of contemporary and nested food system 
57 vulnerabilities. Following the decline in Keynesian welfarism and agricultural productivism of the 
58 
59 1 The newspapers selected included: the Guardian, Telegraph, The Sun, The observer, The Independent, The 
60 evening standard, The Daily Mail and The Mirror. 
1 
2 
60 
 
 
3 1970s,  corporate  retail  expansionism  has  driven  the  internationalisation  of  food  supply  and 
4 consumption. This has fuelled a growing dependency on food imports since the 1980s, which today 
5 constitute 40% of all food consumed in the UK (DEFRA, 2014b). The report ͚Agriculture in the UK 
6 2013͛ (DEFRA, 2014) shows that the value of imports of food, feed and drinks is nearly twice as high 
7 
8 as the value of the exports (£40.2 and 18.9 billion respectively). In terms of production, almost half 
9 of the agricultural area of the UK is dedicated to cereals, with just 3% of the arable area dedicated to 
10 horticultural crops -- a percentage that has been in constant decline since the 1980s (DEFRA, 2014). 
11 Smaller farm holdings are disappearing at a faster rate than those over 100 hectares, despite a 12 
13 general increase of agricultural area. 14 
15 Despite these negative trends, the UK food sector as a whole is expanding, providing 13% of national 
16 employment,  and  contributing  7.1%  to  the  national  Gross  Value  Added  (DEFRA,  2014c).  The 
17 manufacturing of food products shows a high concentration of turnover amongst a few large 
18 companies, which together provide almost 60% of the overall employment in the sector (BIS, 2012). 
19 Food retailing is highly concentrated; at least two-thirds of sales are accounted for by four retailers 20 
21 (Tesco, Sainsbury͛s, Asda and Morrison͛s), with non-multiple stores together reaching just 8% of UK 
22 grocery market shares in 2012. Recent grocery share figures (from Kantar Worldpanel
i 
(September 
23 2014)) show a sharp increase in discount supermarkets as a result of what some commentators refer 
24 to as ͞the supermarket price war͟ii. Meanwhile, independent stores and wholesale markets have 
25 continued to decline, but there has been a rapid growth in the number of farmers͛ markets, 26 
27 indicative of the resurgence of interest in the quality and provenance of food (PMSU, 2008). 
28 
29 One of the main concerns for the UK͛s population today is food prices, which have increased by 18% 
30 in real terms between 2007 and their peak in August 2012 (DEFRA, 2014c). This has affected mainly 
31 low-income households, who have purchased more pork, poultry and eggs than fruit, fish or more 
32 expensive   meats   (DEFRA,   2014c)   --   a   dietary   trend   that   contravenes   the   Government͛s 
33 recommended ͞eatwell plate͟;DEFRA, 2013). In England, 64% of the population is overweight, 34 
35 especially amongst low income families (HSE, 2013). 
36 
37 Government figures now estimate that there are around 13 million people in poverty in the UK -- 
38 that is, one in five people (Department for Work and Pensions, 2014). Alternative sources state that 
39 four million people suffer from food poverty (Gordon et al., 2000 )and that around three million 
40 people suffer from undernourishment or are at risk of being underfed (Brotherton et al., 2010). Not 
41 surprisingly, the UK has recently experienced a significant expansion of charity-run food banks, with 42 
43 estimates of around 500,000 residents now reliant on food aid (Lambie-Mumford et al.,2014).The 
44 factors identified by food aid organisations as important drivers leading people to seek food aid 
45 include both immediate problems that lead to sudden reductions in household income (such as job 
46 losses  and  problems  associated  with  social  security  payments),  and  on-going,  underpinning 47 
48 circumstances (such as continuous low household income and indebtedness) that constrain the 
49 opportunity of purchasing sufficient food to meet household needs (Lambie-Mumford et al., 2014). 
50 
51 
52 
53 a.   Exploring the drivers of nested food system vulnerabilities in the UK 
54 
55 A first stage of the analysis consisted of identifying the main Food and Nutrition Security (FNS) 
56 vulnerability drivers highlighted by the media analysis. In the context of this research, vulnerability 
57 drivers are defined as threats to the food system that may affect its capacity to deliver food and 
58 nutrition security for all. As Table 1 shows, a total of 21 vulnerability drivers were characterized and 
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3 classified according to ecological, social, economic, political and technological dimensions,and with 
4 different levels of importance (++ most mentioned, + mentioned, rarely mentioned). 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 Table 1. Vulnerability drivers identified in the UK media analysis 
11 
12 
13 
14 These results were then discussed with six experts –covering the agricultural sector, anti-poverty 
15 groups, union representatives, sustainability and food chain experts-- through phone interviews to 
16 refine set of vulnerability drivers and their interrelations (see table 2 below, the boxes in purple 
17 
18 contain the modified vulnerability drivers). 
19 
20 
21 
22 Table 2. UK Vulnerability drivers with input from stakeholders 
23 
24 
25 
26 Box 1 deepens this vulnerability analysis by containing the qualtitative Dephi survey responses and 
27 extracts from Round 1 of the survey. There we posed the question to European experts: ͚What are 
28 the key drivers of change of the global food system at the moment?͛ We can see here the linkages 
29 which are made by the respondents between neo-liberalised governance and financialisation as a 
30 major driver, especially since 2007-8. 31 
32 We can see here through this empirical evidence both at national (UK and EU levels) the linkages 
33 between governance and financial drivers and FNS nested vulnerabilities. They identify specific areas 
34 
35 exposed to perturbations that might potentially cause food and nutrition insecurity for specific 
36 vulnerable groups or for the society as a whole (Adger, 2006). Vulnerabilities do not represent 
37 problems or weaknesses per se; they have to be considered in connection with the drivers that are 
38 likely to affect the system, as well as include the level of sensitivity, exposure and adaptive capacity 
39 of the system/sub-systems affected. 40 
41 
42 
43 The main UK ecological vulnerabilities comprise declines in soil fertility, biodiversity, production (in 
44 terms of yields, losses or polluting effects associated to agriculture), and water (including water 
45 footprints  and  overall  water  management).  Socio-cultural  vulnerabilities  encompass  how  the 
46 vulnerability drivers identified above might affect people͛s lifestyle, health and wellness as well as 47 
48 social inequality and incomes. Other vulnerabilities of this kind include information, and particularly 
49 the lack of accessible and transparent information, people͛s skills and unethical behavior, which can 
50 ultimately affect democracy and participation of society in the food system. One important type of 
51 political vulnerability identified revolves around the fragmentation of policies affecting the food 
52 system, combined with weaknesses in public regulation and enforcement. These vulnerabilities are 53 
54 illustrated by examples such as controversies around food labelling schemes, sugar taxes or food 
55 frauds, but also through the shrinking of the welfare state and the emergence of private initiatives 
56 performing those functions -- for instance, the institutionalization of food banks or the tendency to 
57 regulate the food system through private standards. 58 
59 
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3 There  are  several  economic  vulnerabilities  connected  to  political  vulnerabilities,  such  as  the 
4 concentration of power, food markets and logistics. The capacity to influence purchasing habits 
5 through choice editing and influencing consumers͛ behavior is also considered a potential vulnerable 
6 area. The analysis shows that reliance on imported foodstuffs and other inputs such as energy, feed 
7 
8 or water might  constitute  a state of  potential insecurity. Access to land  and other resources 
9 constitutes a key area of potential insecurity, jointly with the financialisation of food. In fact, food is 
10 increasingly becoming a financial asset to be traded over time (e.g. hedge funds) and space. The 
11 growth in financial packages by banks, agricultural commodity trading firms and investment funds is 12 
13 creating more volatility in food prices, as well as land and commodity markets. Finally, technological 
14 vulnerabilities comprise how the vulnerability drivers identified above might affect food safety and 
15 hygiene, the reliance on non-renewable inputs or the policies and politics around research and 
16 development of technologies, including the management of property rights and public access to 
17 knowledge. This last element is connected with the political dimension and also includes how 18 
19 resources are allocated for R&D and how this influences what problems are tackled and what 
20 knowledge is created. 
21 Our media, expert and Delphi analysis (see Box 1) shows that vulnerabilities cannot be considered in 22 
23 isolation, particularly when assessing their relation to food and nutrition security outcomes; that is, 
24 availability,  access  and  utilization  of  good  food  for  all  and  the  stability  and  control  of  these 
25 outcomes(see FAO, 2008). For example, social inequality and low incomes, skills, information, 
26 lifestyle, health and wellness might affect utilization while at the same time also leading to select 27 
28 food stuffs that are not appropriate for a healthy diet. Of particular importance are the system 
29 vulnerabilities that affect the stability and control of FNS outcomes, which include two main issues. 
30 On the one hand, the Delphi results (see box 1) show there is a set of political and economic nested 
31 vulnerabilities   mainly   encapsulated   under   financialisation,   power   concentration   and   the 
32 fragmentation and weakness of public regulation. On the other hand, ecological vulnerabilities 33 
34 linked to resource depletion and degradation also play a key role in providing stability and control of 
35 FNS outcomes. In the case of the UK, losses of biodiversity and soil fertility are particularly relevant. 
36 
37 
38 INSERT BOX 1 
39 
40 
41 
42 5. Managing the impacts of financialisation and vulnerability 
43 
44 
45 
46 a.     Grounding Financialised vulnerability 
47 
48 As we see from the vulnerability analysis above, both in the media and especially amongst 
49 stakeholders and Delphi questions of economic drivers associated with the concentration of power, 
50 financial speculation, land concentration and competition, price volatility and surges, have come to 
51 the fore as both important expressions and drivers of vulnerability in the contemporary EU food 52 
53 system. Here we wish to concentrate further on these sets of nested vulnerabilities by looking at 
54 their expressions and impacts over recent years, and then consider how such financial and economic 
55 vulnerabilities could be reduced. 
56 
57 It has indeed been common in the academic literature to highlight the growth of ͚financialisation͛ as 
58 one key feature and indeed reaction to the unfolding global FFFF crisis. Whilst financialisation has a 
59 long and varied history in its relationship with agriculture especially (see Chayanov, 1966; Kautsky, 
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3 1988; Cronin, 1992), recent writers have pointed to the growth in financial (͚fictitious͛) speculation in 
4 the agricultural land base as a particular feature of the reactions to the overall financial crisis of 
5 2007-8. As Ouma (2016: 2) aptly summarises: 
6 
7 ͚It is not surprising that finance recently turned its eye to farmland and food production…. It 
8 sounds convincing, as finances growing interest in all things agricultural seems a textbook 
9 
10 case of Harvey͛s idea of the spatio-temporal fix (Castree, 2009; Harvey, 1982), after crises 
11 and devaluations in established domains of finance, capital sought greener pastures, 
12 extending its operational space into geographies in which it was not much interested in… 
13 Indeed , since 2007-8 farmland and agriculture is framed as a thing you should bet on͛. 14 
15 This (re-newed) penetration by finance into land and agriculture, which has occurred during a 
16 
17 growing agrarian crisis and food regime instability and volatility (see McMichael, 2012, 2013; 
18 Fairburn, 2014), can be seen as a ͚new frontier͛ with regarding the spatial ͚ fixing͛ of accumulation, 
19 especially in the global South (see Ouma, 2014, 2015). Here we wish to argue the need to adopt a 
20 more grounded and embedded understanding of ͚ financialisatioŶ͛, especially in relation to its 
21 interconnections with other complexities of the food system as a whole. We agree with Ouma 22 
23 (2016:2) when he argues that: (i) ͚ financialisation͛ of farmland may mean different things in different 
24 agrarian contexts; and that (ii) it is valuable to view financialisation not so much as an external force 
25 (essentially an exogenous driver onto the system), but rather incorporate it into the historical and 
26 geographically variegated and grounded performative ͚ action space͛. This leads us to examine the 
27 varied entry points for further ͚ exploring the variegated operations of agri-finance formation͛. 28 
29 
In our analysis, the growing financialisation in the food systems of Europe has reinforced both 
30 
31 market vulnerabilities, especially in: (i) farm gate prices and (ii) the time-space volatilities associated 
32 with general financial investment and food futures markets, which has in turn given more volatility 
33 to agricultural commodity markets across the board. To explore how these new rounds of 
34 financialisation are creating interconnected vulnerabilities in food system dynamics, we will 
35 nowfocus on each specific expression of the problem. 36 
37 
b. Rejuvenating Farm-based cost-price squeeze volatilities: the combined effects of financialisation 
38 
39 and deregulated market exposure. 
40 
41 Since the inception of the FFFF in 2007-8,far from benefitting from the renewed interest of 
42 financiers in farmland and all things agricultural, UK farmers have overall faced a more intense and 
43 indeed more volatile market context, higher input costs and a depreciation of their farm household 
44 incomes. Despite the investors claims (Jim Rogers)͛s claim that ͚farmers are going to be driving 
45 Lamborghinis: stockbrokers are going to be driving tractors͛ (Quoted in Harding, 2012; Ouma, 2016), 46 
47 and that no matter how bad things get, we all have to eat͛ (The Economist, 2009), British and 
48 European farmers more generally have experienced a growth in vulnerabilities across the different 
49 sectors. Whilst agricultural and forestry land prices have escalated as many cash-rich financiers and 
50 other urban rich have seen farm land as a key ͚ safe haven͛ for investment during periods when other 51 
52 investments have seemed too risky, strictly agricultural producer returns on investment have 
53 continued to decline. 
54 
55 
56 
57 The relationships between renewed financialisation and the farming community are far from linear. 
58 In fact farms have been closing, with recently over half of all dairy farmers arguing they are thinking 
59 of quitting the sector in the next few years and at least six farms foreclosing weekly in England and 
60 
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3 Wales during 2015-16. The volatility in markets, the disproportionate buying power of the corporate 
4 retailers and processors, as well as their increasingly selective processes of recruiting ͚ dedicated 
5 suppliers͛, have combined to increase the structural vulnerability of the sector. By 2016, hardly any 
6 farm sector in the UK was experiencing stable or rising incomes due to these factors. This has led 
7 
8 bodies (not least the Farmers Unions, Farmers for Action and recently the Agricultural and 
9 Horticultural Development Board)
2 
to hold fora and lobbying sessions on managing this increasing 
10 amount of volatility (see Farmers Weekly, Feb, 2016). Wheat futures markets, milk, horticulture and 
11 beef and pigs markets have all been declining, mostly as a result of the exposure to the increased 12 
13 financialisation of the markets. 14 
15 Both the Westminster House of Commons and House of Lords Select Committees have recently 
16 completed cross-party studies and enquiries about this price volatility (see HoC, 2016, HoL, 2016)
3
. 
17 The latter report named 8 key combined drivers for the increasing price and financial volatility: 
18 weather shocks in supplying countries, declining stocks, lowinvestment, trade policy of export and 
19 importing countries, increasing demand for bio-fuels, rising demand in developing countries 20 
21 (especially India and China), financialisation of agricultural commodity markets, and higher carbon 
22 based oil and fertiliser prices. We see here important parallels with our earlier media and 
23 stakeholder and Delphi analysis in that financialisation is embedded as a driver of vulnerability, and 
24 directly interlinked with related aspects of resource depletion and uncertainty over carbon –based 
25 supplies. Farmers become a fulcrum and a bell-weather for being increasingly exposed and having to 26 
27 manage these combined and ͚ nested͛ vulnerabilities; all of which have different space-time 
28 components. 
29 
30 This is, however only half the picture regarding producer vulnerability, as the strictly financialised 
31 market vulnerabilities have combined with further deregulation of state support structures that 
32 were originally designed in the immediate post-war period to improve the resilience of farming 
33 incomes and prices. In particular the reform of the EU͛s Common Agricultural Policy from commodity 
34 
35 price support towards decoupled payments has increasingly exposed farmers to the now more 
36 volatile and speculative market prices across most of the production sectors. These deregulations 
37 are thus increasing market exposure (HoL,2016: 22): 
38 
39 ͚According to DEFRA, the intensity of market intervention has declined significantly as a 
40 result of CAP reform since the early 1990s, leaving EU markets more open to respond to 
41 fluctuations of supply and demand…. De-regulation has meant that farmers have now to 
42 
43 actively manage their own price risk. Clearly this is a huge challenge for the industry, which 
44 requires broader and new sets of management skills, beyond the traditional physical skills…. 
45 Despite the decline in Market intervention…the EU retained a number of market 
46 management tools, including intervention buying and export subsidies.͛ 47 
48 
These latter potential measures are not, however, comprehensive, and combine with other related 
49 
50 perturbations associated with the recent Russian food trade embargo and the removal of milk quota 
51 regulations that are increasing the exposure of producers to market volatilities. It is a double (state 
52 and marketised) edged sword, just coming at a time, as we shall see below, when some policy 
53 
54 
55 2 The authors have been in regular conversations and discussions with these groups as part of the overall 
56 primary and secondary research with stakeholders. The Farmers for Action group has led a sustained campaign 
57 to promote the role of producers and to lobby government for ͚ fairer prices for farmers͛. The Agricultural and 
58 Horticultural Development Board is a major ͚ levy agency͛ for the promotion of farm products and innovation in 
59 the sector. 
60 3 Marsden has been a member of the Rural Economy House of Lords Group which promoted these inquiries. 
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3 makers are beginning to ask of the production sector to become more ͚resilient͛, produce more, 
4 more sustainably and with less carbon inputs. 
5 
6 How to cope with these combined and more financialised vulnerabilities becomes a major challenge 
7 for the farming community, since, as some commentators predict, it is likely to lead to a decline in 
8 the overall resilience of the productive sector, to reduce capacity and investment in productive 
9 
10 capital and infrastructures and to trigger further rural depopulation (Marsh, HoL, 2016). For many 
11 policy-makers who do not envisage or indeed advocate a return to more comprehensive post-war 
12 farmer price support, the main solution to these conditions is to build up the Darwinian 
13 individualised adaptive capacity and resilience of the farm businesses that remain, and concentrate 14 
15 upon supply side policies (like upgrading the business skills and planning/ management skills of the 
16 farm population). This individualised and neo-liberalised notion of resilience (see Davoudi, 2016) is 
17 seen as one of the main antidotes to the combined systemic vulnerabilities that the UK and 
18 European farm production sector are now facing. As the recent HoL report (pp15) concludes, for 
19 instance: 20 
21 ͚ A degree of price volatility sends crucial market signals, which inform production and 
22 
23 investment decisions. It also provides incentives for innovation and efficiency gains... 
24 Preparedness for price movements will assist farmers in their investment and business 
25 decisions, but will not eliminate risk.͛ 
26 
27 in sum, financialised vulnerabilities as experienced in the UK food system post 2007-8 have become 
28 embedded and nested within a wider set of interlinked vulnerabilities that become expressed, 
29 relationally, on the farm production sector. More financialised and speculative markets have 
30 
31 combined with both more deregulated policy changes, and the continued growth of a highly 
32 oligopolistic food processing and retailing sector, to further expose the relatively de-concentrated 
33 farm sector to conditions that are seriously affecting its medium and long term resilience. 
34 
35 During this period, corporate retailers have tended to be more concerned with the more intense 
36 horizontal competition they have faced, especially from the retail discounters, which has then 
37 further intensified price pressure vertically down the line to their processor and farm suppliers. This 
38 
39 process of intensification of margins and prices continues to generate shareholder dividends for 
40 investors in the corporate retailers. In the absence of a strong political commitment to develop state 
41 farm policies to protect the national farm infrastructures (as was a feature of the earlier stages of 
42 policy , see figure 1), it is likely that these systemic vulnerabilities will continue to inflict a neo- 
43 liberalised Darwinian struggle on to the farm sector; one which, for many, will presage further 44 
45 intensification of production on a smaller number of farm businesses. One recent example of this 
46 has been given by the recently appointed Office of Groceries Code Adjudicator (GCA, 2016,), which 
47 found the retailer Tesco guilty of delaying payments to their suppliers and externalising their own 
48 financialised risks to the upstream sector.
4
With regard to the inquiry on how Tesco overwhelmingly 
49 
50 focus upon meeting their own financial targets), she tellingly concludes: 51 
52 ͚ Tesco staff seek agreement from suppliers to the deferral of payments due to them in 
53 order to temporarily to help Tesco margin. I saw internal Tesco emails suggesting that 
54 payments should not be made to suppliers before a certain date in order to avoid 
55 
56 
57 4 After a protracted process led by producer and food supply organisations, and several Competition 
58 Commission enquiries into corporate retail practices, the UK Coalition government of 2010 agreed to establish 
59 an independent Grocery Code Adjudicator who would have some powers to independently explore complaints 
60 about retailer supply chain practices on suppliers. 
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3 underperformance against a forecasted margin. I found that Tesco knowingly delayed paying 
4 money to suppliers (sometimes up to 24 months) in order to improve their own financial 
5 position͛. 
6 
7 Referring again to our systems conceptual model, we can conclude here then that the dominant 
8 regime in agri-food has been incorporating new rounds of financialisation at the same time as 
9 
10 deregulating the role of state intervention in the production sector. These effects, in turn, are 
11 transmitting a wider cocktail of combined vulnerabilities onto the farm sector, which in itself is 
12 becoming less ecologically, socially and economically resilient. Here financialisation becomes an 
13 embedded source of vulnerabilities, and it is, in many ways, only a means of transmitting these 14 
15 around the system as a whole. It is somewhat ironic perhaps that the very ecologically-based 
16 reasons for this new round of financialisation (the global food supply crisis) is in itself then 
17 promoting- through the active articulation of the nested connections we outline here- more 
18 ecological and economic vulnerability at the local farm level itself. This, indeed, is one advantage of 
19 adopting a critical systemic view of food system vulnerabilities as a hybrid socio-technical system 20 
21 that produces different power relations and multi-regime interactions. Such view, as we have 
22 attempted to demonstrate, allows us to understand how vulnerabilities become embedded and 
23 reinforced not only by individual components but in a combined sense, which creates overall levels 
24 of disfunctionality in the system as a whole. 25 
26 
27 
28 c. The rise of stranded assets on agri food: exploring the evolution of the food-energy-finance 
29 nexus 
30 
31 
A second and related entry point with regard to the location and impact of financialisation in our 
32 
33 conceptualisation of food vulnerabilities relates to very recent realisations about continued resource 
34 depletion and climate change. In particular, the recent announcements at the global level of both 
35 the revised Sustainable Development Goals and the landmark commitments by 196 countries to 
36 limit carbon emissions (Paris COP21) are suggesting the possibilities of significant changes in state 
37 and financial investment strategies (see Marsden in press). As we argued earlier, our conceptual 38 
39 model proposes to incorporate not just the significance of the dominant food regime butalso multi- 
40 regime interactions into our thinking, especially concerning the increasing bio-economic and nexus 
41 relationships between energy, food, fibre and finance. Again, here we see financialisation as an 
42 embedded and grounded set of relations that in fact lubricate, in a variety of ways, the power and 
43 commodity relations of this important nexus. Indeed, with the rise of the bio-economy ( Brunori, 44 
45 2013; Marsden and Farioli, 2015), multi-regime interactions are beginning to play out in setting 
46 potential conditions for a real (but highly contested) post-carbonised transition. This inevitably 
47 means a renewed emphasis upon the bio-sphere for obtaining the resources to live and be secure. 
48 
49 A significant push factor for the post-carbon transition in the nexus as a whole could now be 
50 developing with the rise of what some investment analysts have been calling the rise of ͚ stranded 
51 
52 assets͛ (see Caldecott et al 2014). As many leading banking and financial leaders have been 
53 proclaiming this recently (see Carney, 2015), this expression suggests that a new set of nexus 
54 vulnerabilities are developing FOR the financial sector itself, with regard to its considerable over- 
55 reliance upon carbon based asset investments. There has been a spate of recent national 
56 divestments in carbon-based assets, such as that occurring in Norway in 2015 and those set in 57 
58 motion by key financial players, such as Morgan Stanley, Citi group and Wellsfargo and Co. A 
59 combination of spatially variable pressures and restrictions in exploiting coal, oil and gas deposits 
60 
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3 following COP21 seems to suggest that we are beginning to witness the end of the ͚ multi-trillion 
4 dollar agri-bubble͛(Business Green, 2013), and that financial investment firms need to rethink their 
5 medium and long term investment strategies, such that they do not fall victim to what the Governor 
6 of the Bank of England Mark Carney (2015) has called the ͚ tragedy of the horizons͛. 
7 
8 
This is beginning to suggest that the investment in agricultural and agri-food resources, which 
9 
10 especially from 2002 has been the longest commodity boom since 1945, is coming to an end. Global 
11 farmland asset values ballooned during this period, rising by more than 400% from 2002. ͚ Stranded 
12 assets͛ that suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs, downward revaluations or 
13 conversion into liabilities can be caused, it is increasingly recognised, by a new and combined set of 14 
15 environmental and associated regulatory risks and vulnerabilities. These are highly entwined in the 
16 agri-food regime and spill over into other multi-regime interactions. They include, for instance, ͚ first 
17 nature͛ climate, water and soil events and shocks to supply; new and more comprehensive 
18 government regulations regarding carbon pricing, air pollution regulation planning and protected 
19 areas management; falling clean technology costs (e.g., solar PV in China, onshore and offshore 20 
21 marine, tidal and wind systems); and the rise of open source and translocal cooperative knowledge 
22 sharing (see Caldecott, 2015). More specifically with regard to the agri-food sector, we can include 
23 the regulations restricting the expansion of GM, the creation of new pests and pathogens as a result 
24 of it, the disruption of biotic communities in agro-eco-systems and irreparable losses or changes in 
25 species diversity or genetic diversity with species. 26 
27 
More broadly, we see here how both first (ecological) and second (human-induced) natures are 
28 
29 indeed beginning to͛ kick back͛ upon the process of financialisation of carbonised resource 
30 exploitation, when the latter represents over a third of main stock market investments (see Carney, 
31 2015). These emerging disinvestment financial strategies could hold significant opportunities but 
32 could also create further vulnerabilities for the agri-food system. Again, it will depend on how these 
33 processes are managed and governed. What is becoming clear is that when environment-related 34 
35 risks materialise and become communicated across places and spaces, they can result in stranded 
36 and devalorising assets across the increasingly vulnerable and financialised supply chain. Given that 
37 there has been so much agri-food investment over recent years, this could create more intense 
38 volatility in investment withdrawals, leading potentially to the exacerbation of the spread of pest 
39 and diseases, and, for instance, the changing nature of bio-fuel regulations. What is clear is that the 40 
41 potential challenge of stranded assets in agriculture is currently being intensified by the ongoing 
42 global agricultural boom, which in turn is feeding off high commodity prices and poor investment 
43 returns in other sectors. 
44 
45 We are witnessing, in other words, a new set of vulnerabilities at the heart of the financialised 
46 capitalist-ecology system, which are suggesting social, political and ecological ͚ liŵits͛ to the 
47 
48 carbonised spatial fixes (and speculative bubbles)that this has created, especially over last the 
49 decade (see Moore, 2015). As Moore has argued, this could perhaps presage the beginning of the 
50 end of ͚ cheap natures͛, whereby capitalist accumulation can no longer rely upon externalising its 
51 carbon-based exploitative vulnerabilities, in a systemic context where this is also increasingly no 
52 longer seen as publically legitimate. It also challenges, as Carney (2015) suggests, the in-built 53 
54 cognitive short-termism displayed in the recent past both in the financial sector and in many state 
55 bodies. 
56 
57 Overall, the arrival and the incidence of ͚stranded assets͛ could be the ͚tip of the iceberg͛ for 
58 renewed and refreshed long term investment in renewable energies like solar, marine and wind; and 
59 indeed could promote farm-based diversification and multifunctionality such that farms become 
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3 (again) part net contributors to the post carbon food-energy nexus. Reflecting on our conceptual 
4 model of food system vulnerabilities, we need to see the arrival of ͚ stranded assets͛ as conceptually 
5 far more than a part of a financialisation factor or ͚black- box͛ in the model. It is more of a macro- 
6 landscape change and multi-regime factor affecting the inter -connected sets of dominant regimes 
7 
8 across the food, energy, bio-economy sectors, which is then likely to have profound effects upon the 
9 rest of the system interactions outlined in our model. 
10 
11 
12 
13 6. Conclusions: from vulnerabilities to resilience in agri-food system futures? 
14 
15 The paper has explored the emergence of recent systemic and nested vulnerabilities in the agri-food 
16 system with reference to the UK and EU food sector in particular. First, we have outlined the recent 
17 confluence of both food insecurities and food unsustainability since 2007-8 (figure 1). We then, 
18 
19 second, adopted a focussed framework for examining the linkages between food governance , 
20 renewed and more intensive financialisation, and the development of a range of interconnected 
21 vulnerabilities since the 2007-87 crisis (sections 3 and 4). This examines the diversity and effects of 
22 the interconnected vulnerabilities in one specific empirical context (the EU/ UK). Third, in the final 
23 parts of the paper, (sections 4 and 5) we have focussed upon what were categorised as the more 24 
25 economic/financial dimensions emerging from this empirical analysis, and then begun to unpack 
26 some of the impacts of ͚financialisatioŶ͛, which was seen as a major source of vulnerability in the 
27 system by many of our respondents. 
28 
29 As we have shown, and following Isakson (2015) and Ouma et al (2016), the adoption of a more 
30 grounded, embedded and, indeed, relational approach to financialisation uncovers far more fine- 
31 grained relationships. Financialisation is not one act or game in the agri-food system. It covers many 
32 
33 games, and we can conclude that it does not fit easily into any single conceptual box. It is a multi- 
34 plex process, feeding off the crisis in neo-liberal governance, and affecting the wider economic and 
35 social dynamics of the overall food system. As we have learnt by exploring it͛s combinational effects 
36 upon, first, the farm sector in the UK and, second, in its role now in defining new (de)valuations of 
37 carbon based resources and their renewable alternatives, financialisation is now embedded into a 38 
39 wider state-corporate-market nexus and regime that is reproducing ecological, social and economic 
40 vulnerabilities. In this sense, financialisation is in itself also a relational outcome of embedded 
41 existing and future power relations in this hybrid-socio-technical system. 
42 
43 An implication of this analysis is that we need to continue to build and refine our conceptual 
44 frameworks of food system vulnerabilities, so as to target where collective actions and perhaps 
45 more publically generated ͚ global and (trans-local) local commons͛ can be created to make 
46 
47 transitions towards more effective and functional resiliences between food security and food 
48 sustainability. The global SDGs and the COP21 processes are the start of creating major and more 
49 reflexive state- based actions towards re-shaping investment strategies in the food-energy nexus. 
50 At the local and regional scales new translocal networks and assemblages associated with shorter- 51 
52 food supply chains and interfaces are becoming more widespread (Constance et al 2015). They are 
53 potential ͚ game changers͛, as we are beginning to see, not least in re-directing financial investment 
54 futures and, more specifically agri-food markets of commodities and land resources. They are 
55 indeed, in themselves, collective ͚ public common͛ reactions to the many interconnected 
56 vulnerabilities we have identified in this paper. 57 
58 
They are not only, of course, associated with the agri-food system. Finance flows, as we have seen, 
59 
 
often quickly occur both within and between different resource-based systems. A key implication 
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3 here is that we will need to build more effective multi-sector frameworks that integrate the nexus of 
4 energy, water, and food, ecologies into our understandings of food vulnerabilities, if we are to tease 
5 out more resilient pathways that really engage in progressing a more sustainable post-carbon 
6 transition. Theoretically as well as practically, it will be necessary for both researchers and (multi- 
7 
8 level) state authorities to reflexively recognise and adapt to these interconnected and complex 
9 systems, rather than relying on either outdated notions of ͚the market͛ or on individualised 
10 conceptions of resilience that, as we have seen here, tend to allocate far more of the risks and 
11 vulnerabilities to their victims, be they consumers, producers or their local natures. 12 
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2 
3 
4 
5 DELPHI results: What are the key drivers of change of the global system at the moment? 
6 
7 • ͞Seen through a food regime analysis lens, the food price spikes in 2007-2008 and the resulting riots 
8 can be seen as an externalization of the crisis of the corporate-led food regime that took control of the 
9 
10 global food system in the 1980s, buttressed up by intellectual property protection that stimulated 
11 corporate concentration and by structural adjustment policies and WTO regulations that limit states’ 
12 policy space to pursue national food security objectives. Today the ability of the corporate regime to 
13 organize global relations of food production and circulation of food, and the WTO’s capacity to manage 14 
15 global markets, in doubt. Additionally, there are legitimate suspicions that the expansion of a 
16 productivist and market-based solution to global food provision may be reaching its absolute limits in 
17 ecological and climate terms͟. 
18 
19 • ͞absence of coordination in different levels, between authorities (EU, national, regional) or within the 
20 
21 agri-food chain value, poor knowledge transfer and exchange due to low connectivity between 
22 knowledge development (e.g. companies, universities) and practical implementation (e.g. farmers)͟ 
23 • Increasing pest and disease pressure, which is created by new species favoure by increasing trade 
24 flows and climate change, as well as resistance development, which can be tackled properly due to the 
25 regulatory system 26 
27 
28 • Financial crisis, impending sector’s capability to invest. 
29 - Peak oil (and subsequent effects on the extraction of raw materials, national economies and 
30 consumer practices) 
31 
32 - Globalisation 
33 - Financial decisions 
34 - Political decisions (regarding property, State and legislation)* 
35 - Financial decisions 
36 - History of low-priced fossil fuels, which have led to the destruction of oil-independent structures 37 
38 from government and the lack of financial sources. 
39 
40 • ͞Lack of financial resources, lobbying in Brussels, lack of integration of states at UE level, lack of 
41 comprehensive and holistic perspective gathering the different issues (environmental, social, 
42 
43 nutritional), lack of knowledge. 
44 
45 • I think the primary drivers of change are economic and political, including: 
46 - Financial capital (speculation and commoditization) 
47 - Neoliberal globalization (growth by decreasing barriers to trade, eliminating subsidies, etc.) 
48 
49 - Competition between producers (which causes consolidation on greater scales, and the reduction 
50 of the number of full-time farmers 
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2 
3 • In fact, the EU is in the driver seat of neoliberal globalization, especially since the financial crisis 
4 and the rise of austerity politics within the EU. 
5 
6 
7 • ͞the export-oriented ͞ free trade͟ agenda of capital and multinational companies 
8 • The privatization of resources (land, water, seeds….) 
9 
10 
11 The attempts to further ͞ modernize͟ farming by biotechnology companies (GMO, precision 
12 farmiŶg…) 
13 - the attraction of land and commodity markets for financial capital 
14 
15 • financialization of nature (REDD, climate smart agriculture…Ϳ 
16 
17 
18 • the growing food sovereignty movement (Nyeleni movement), which unifies peasant farmers, 
19 land workers, urban initiatives, scientists, indigenous communities and which struggles to re- 
20 localize and re-democratize food systems͟ 
21 
22 
23 • The sector of small-scale food producers around the world, gather several hundreds of millions 
24 of producers that face economic, ecological, political, social and cultural challenges: their ability 
25 to create new spaces for participation in markets and political decision processes on the local, 
26 national, regional and global level 
27 
28 
29 • The corporate sector, which gathers the interest of the major national, regional and 
30 transnational corporations involved directly or indirectly into food systems, their influence in 
31 design abd implementation of public policies, and with impacts on the spaces of small-scale 
32 
33 food producers͛ participation in markets and political processes͟ 
34 
•
 
35 • The governmental and intergovernmental institutions with direct or indirect interventions of 
36 food and nutrition, such as through trade, energy, investment, finance, agricultural, mining, 
37 nutrition or development policies 38 
39 
40 • The consumer organizations, consumer patterns and their relation with the dominant national 
41 and transnational players, including through promotion and marketing practices 
42 • Changes in global environment, including climate change, energy crisis, energy crisis, regional 
43 
44 and global geopolitical developments. Economic policies dominated by the old group of OECD 
45 countries, plus China 
46 
47 • Technological developments in different models, including the two most opposite approaches: 
48 the input-intensive industrial production and consumptions model, and the agro-ecology based 
49 
50 approaches on sustainable, human rights compliant and democratized food systems. 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 No. In fact, the EU is in the driver seat of neoliberal globalization, especially since the financial 
4 crisis and the rise of austerity politics within the EU. 
5 
6 ͞the export-oriented ͞ free trade͟ agenda of capital and multinational companies 
7 
8 
the privatization of resources (land, water, seeds, ….) 
9 
10 
the attempts to further ͞ modernize͟ farming by biotechnology companies (GMO, precision 
11 
12 farming…) 13 
14 →the attraction of land and commodity markets for financial capital 
15 
16 the change of consumption habits (more meat and dairy in some countries, trend to veganism in 
17 other countries) 
18 
19 financialisation of nature (REDD, climate smart agriculture…) 
20 
21 the growing food sovereignty movement (Nyéléni movement), which unifies peasant farmers, 
22 land workers, urban initiatives, scientists, indigenous communities and which struggles to re- 
23 localize and re-democratize food systems͟ 
24 
25 all of the above mentioned drivers but additionally the influence of farmer organisations like 
26 COPA-COGECA and their close relations to biotechnology industry and financial capital 
27 
28 
The sector of small-scale food producers around the world, gather several hundreds of millions of 
29 
30 producers that face economic, ecological, political, social and cultural challenges: their ability to 
31 create new spaces for participation in markets and political decision processes on the local, 
32 national, regional and global level 
33 
34 The corporate sector, which gathers the interests of the major national, regional and 
35 transnational corporations involved direct or indirectly into food system, their influence in design 
36 and implementation of public policies, and with impacts on the spaces of small-scale food 
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38 producers’ participation in markets and political processes͟ 
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40 The governmental and intergovernmental institutions with direct or indirect interventions on food 
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45 and transnational players, including through promotion and marketing practices 
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47 Changes in the global environment, including climate change, energy crisis, financial crisis, 
48 regional and global geopolitical development. Economic policies dominated by the old group of 
49 
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52 Technological developments in different models, including the two most opposite approach: the 
53 input-intensive industrial production and consumptions model, and the agro-ecology based 
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56 - competition between producers (which causes consolidation on greater scales, and the 
57 reduction of the number of full-time farmers) 
58 
59 
60 
 
